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Abstract   The public has increasingly demonstrated a strong support for open space 
preservation.  Questions left to local policy-makers are how local governments can 
finance preservation of open space in a politically desirable way, whether there exists an 
optimal level of open space that can maximize the net value of developable land in a 
community and that can also be financed politically desirably, and what is the effect of 
the spatial configuration of preserved open space when local residents perceive open 
space amenities differ spatially.  Our economic model found the condition for the 
existence of an optimal level of open space is not very restrictive, the increased tax 
revenue generated by the capitalization of open space amenity into property value can 
fully cover the cost of preserving this optimal level of open space under a weak 
condition, and being evenly distributed and centrally located is very likely to characterize 
the optimal spatial configuration of preserved open space in terms of net social value and 
the capacity of tax increment financing. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The public has been concerned with preserving open space from development in their 
neighborhood for decades.  The Trust for Public Land finds that in both robust and 
challenging economic times since 1996, American voters have strongly supported 
conservation finance measures that preserve natural lands, create parks, and protect 
farmland, and more than 77 percent of the conservation finance ballot measures were 
approved, generating a total of $27 billion.  The market, however, often fails to provide 
open space optimally, despite the substantial social value attached to open space, since 
the value of open space as a local public good doesn’t, in most cases, fully accrue to the 
private land owner who provides them.  In response, planners and local land managers 
have adopted many policy instruments to promote open space preservation (Bengston et. 
al. 2004, Porter 1997).  One common approach extensively used across the U.S. is 
purchase of land designated as open space or rights to development (Myers and Puentes 
2001, Porter 1997, Kelly 1993).  An interesting question related to the purchase of open 
space land is how local government can balance their budget to cover the cost of the 
public investment in open space.  If acquisition of open space land requires a tax 
increase, it may not be politically desirable although people strongly support preserving 
open space.  According to a survey conducted by the National Association of Realtors 
(2001), 75% voters would like their local governments to buy land to create new open 
space in their communities, but most oppose increasing their property taxes by more than 
$50 a year to pay the cost of acquiring open space land.     
Some studies have pointed out acquisition of open space land may be financed by 
the increment in tax revenue generated by property value appreciation in response to the   3
preservation of open space.  For example, based on a hedonic study on single-family 
home sales in Portland, Oregon, Netusil et al. (2000) find open space could increase 
property value in high value neighborhoods and they further speculate that funding for 
the development and maintenance of open space may be generated simply by their 
preservation, that is, self-financing.  An earlier illustration of the same proposition 
emerges from the construction of New York’s Central Park.  When the designer, 
Frederick Law Olmsted, was asked how the city could pay for the park, Frederick 
responded that the presence of the park would raise property values and the extra tax 
revenue generated would easily repay the construction costs.  A subsequent empirical 
investigation on the relationship between the park and real estate value verified his point 
and was widely disseminated (see Fox 1990).      
The idea that acquisition of open space may be financed by preservation seems 
promising since a large literature has demonstrated the positive effect of open space on 
local property value (see McConnell and Walls (2005) for a review).  There also have 
been anecdotes showing that markets in certain circumstances can spontaneously provide 
open space from the same motivation.  For example, in a study on market provision of 
open space, Heal (2001) presented two examples.  The developer of Spring Island off the 
coast of South Carolina built only 500 high-value properties instead of constructing the 
5,500 homes permitted, and conserved the balance of the land to raise the value of the 
homes sufficiently maximizing their profit.  Similarly, hunters in Montana, concerned 
with the effect of summer home development, borrowed money to buy the land and 
finance the construction of a small number of luxury homes.  The hunters placed a 
conservation easement on the remainder of the land, reserving the right to hunt on it   4
themselves, and sold the houses for more than the total cost of buying the land and 
building the houses.  A recent issue of New York Times reports the St. Joe Company, 
Florida’s largest private landowner holding 800,000 mostly inland acres in the scrubby, 
unremarkable pine forests of the Panhandle, is pushing “new ruralism” by low-density 
development and providing large amounts of open space in neighborhoods to attract city 
and suburban dwellers who are weary of civilization (Goodnough 2005).          
All these examples suggest the possibility that open space can be paid for by its 
preservation.  In fact, the public sectors of local governments have used tax increment 
from assessed property value to finance local economic development, especially in the 
1980s and 1990s, when there were declines in subsidies from federal and state grants 
(Anderson 1990, Chapman 1998, Dye and Merriman 2006).  A natural question is what is 
the condition that open space preservation can be self-financed.  Does there exist a 
socially optimal amount of open space that can maximize the value of developable land 
in a community and that can also be self-financed?  Studies have found the appreciated 
property (land) value induced by open space preservation exhibits a spatial pattern, which 
is related to the spatial characteristics of preserved open space, such as size, shape, and 
spatial location.  How do these spatial factors of open space affect the possibility of using 
property tax increment to finance the acquisition of open space land? What is the optimal 
structure of open space that can be self-financed?  In this study, we focus on economics 
of self-financed preservation of open space.  More specifically, we develop a model to 
formally explore the possibility of using property tax increment to finance public 
investments in open space.  We formulate our model within a context that local residents 
value and are willing to pay for open space in their neighborhood.  Consequently, local   5
land managers may increase the value of community land and thus tax revenue by 
systematically investing in open space, and the fiscal gain by appreciated property value, 
in turn, will be used to cover these public investments.   
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops a model to help 
understand how open space can potentially raise local property value, which provides a 
theoretical basis for public investment in open space.  More specifically, we identify the 
conditions under which the public investment in open space is socially optimal in terms 
of the maximized net value of developable land in communities.  Section 3 introduces a 
budget constraint that the expenditure in open space preservation is fully covered by 
property tax increment due to amenity-induced property value appreciation, and 
examines the condition under which the socially efficient level of open space can be fully 
covered by increased tax revenue.  Since property value may exhibit a spatial pattern 
depending on the spatial distribution of open space amenities for communities or 
neighborhoods of large scales, we examine the effect of spatial heterogeneity in open 
space amenities on the conditions for tax increment financing in Section 4.  Section 5 
uses simulation to explore the effect of spatial configurations of preserved open space.  
The policy-relevant formulation of the spatial aspects examined allows implications on 
the optimal structure of the socially efficient, self-financed level of preserved open space.  
We conclude this economic inquiry in Section 6.     
 
II.  Land Value and Optimal Open Space Preservation: A Theoretical Model 
Consider residential communities or towns in a metropolitian area with varying average 
distance x to the central business district (CBD).  These residential communities are   6
characterized by varying amounts of open space (public goods) a, which mimics the 
prototype of a series of local towns depicted in Tiebout’s theory (1956) on local 
expenditures.  Following the traditional monocentric urban model, each household 
chooses residential location (community) represented by (x, a), house size q in units of 
land area in the selected residential community, and a numeraire good z to maximize their 
utility U = U(z, q, a).  Each household is subject to a budget constraint z + Rq + tx = y, 
where R denotes land rent, t denotes transportation cost per unit distance, and y is 
household income.   
For given land rent R and transportation cost t, the utility-maximizing choice of 
house size q and numeraire good z can be represented as q
* = q(y, t, x, R, a) and z
* = y – 
tx – Rq(y, t, x, R, a), respectively.  Substitute the optimal consumption bundle (z
*, q
*) 
into the utility function, U = U[y-Rq(y, t, x, R, a)-tx, q(y, t, x, R, a), a].  For an open city 
model, household utility U at equilibrium is exogenously determined when migration is 
costless, which is equal to the maximum utility attainable elsewhere in the economy.  
Denote the exogenous utility level by V, which is expressed as  
V = U(y-Rq(y, t, x, R, a)-tx, q(y, t, x, R, a), a)                            (1)  
For given income level, transportation cost, and residential community, land rent 
R has to change such that U(y, t, x, a, R) = V.  Solving equation (1) for R, we can derive 
the equilibrium land rent R = R(y, t, x, V, a), which represents the bid rent of each 
household for per unit land in community (x, a) at market equilibrium.  We suppress all 
arguments but open space area a, and express the equilibrium land rent R as a function of 
preserved open space, R = R(a).  Assume the utility function U(⋅) is concave, and it can 
be shown that    7
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which indicate that the equilibrium land rent is increasing with the amount of preserved 
open space at a decreasing rate.  
For a community with preserved open space a, the equilibrium price per unit land 
P(a) is the present value of the flow of equilibrium land rent net of property tax in an 
infinite horizon, i.e., P(a) = (R(a)-P(a)τ)/δ, where δ  is the discount rate, and τ is the 
property tax rate.  Further, equilibrium land price P(a) can be solved as P(a) = R(a)/(i+τ).  
That is, equilibrium land price equals equilibrium land rent divided by the sum of the 
discount rate and the property tax rate.  Similarly, the equilibrium land price in the 
community increases with preserved open space at a decreasing rate, P’(a) > 0, P”(a) ≤ 0.  
This linkage between equilibrium land price and preserved open space shows how 
property value would respond to open space preservation in a dynamic setting, which 
constitutes the basis for using property tax increment to finance investment in open space.    
The context for exploring the potential of using property tax increment to finance 
open space preservation is set up by a community with a total land area L and a units of 
preserved open space that may or may not be socially optimal.  Suppose land in this 
community, except those preserved as open space, is privately owned by decentralized 
absentee landowners.  The local land manager is concerned with the negative effect of 
urban sprawl, and decides to preserve more open space to protect against the welfare loss 
of local public.  A practical question confronting him at the very beginning is how much 
more open space land need to be acquired for preservation that is socially optimal.  The 
land manager, informed by policy analysts, knows that economic efficiency requires 
preserving open space up to a level such that the marginal benefit of preserving open   8
space is equal to the marginal cost.  Denote the cost of preserving a units of open space 
by C(a) = P(a
0)a, where P(a
0) is the equilibrium price for land in this community with a
0 
units of preserved open space, and is the price at which more land will be purchased if 
further preservation is needed.  Denote the benefit of preserving a units of open space by 
B(a), its measure, however, is not as explicit as the cost.  Since the utility of local 
residents, under the assumption that local residents can costless migrate between 
communities, is exogenous, an appropriate policy objective for the local land manager is 
to maximize the total value of community developable land in the interest of land owners 
(Brueckner 1982, 1983).  Therefore, the benefit of preserving open space can be 
expressed as B(a) = P(a + a
0)(L – a
0 – a), where P(a + a
0) is the equilibrium land price 
after a units of open space have been preserved, and L – a
0 – a  is the area of the 
remaining land after preservation.  Consequently, the marginal benefit equal to the 
marginal cost yields 
P’(a + a
0) (L – a
0 – a) - P(a + a
0) = P(a
0)             (2) 
Equation (2) can be used to determine the optimal increment of open space to be 
purchased, which, however, may be equal to zero, i.e., no more preservation is need for 
given people’s preference.  An interesting question is under what conditions preserving 
more open space would be socially efficient, which is directly related to subsequent 
investigation of conditions under which the socially efficient amount of open space can 
be financed by property tax increment.     
Move P(a
* + a
0) in (2) to the right hand side, and divide both sides by (L – a
0 – a
*) 
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The right hand side of (3) is the marginal cost per unit remaining land, which is the sum 
of cost spent on purchasing an extra unit of open space and the value lost that would have 
been gained otherwise from this extra unit of land, divided by the amount of the 
remaining land.  The left hand side of (3) represents the marginal benefit per unit 
remaining land at the optimal preservation.  From the perspective of the capitalization of 
open space amenity in property value at market equilibrium, this marginal land price at 
the optimal preservation represents residents’ willingness to pay for per unit preserved 
open space.  Because residents’ willingness to pay may be dependent on the price level 
considered, we divide both sides of (3) by the post-preservation equilibrium land price:        
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We use this equation to identify the condition for preserving more open space to be 
socially efficient, namely the condition under which a
* > 0.  The left hand side of 
equation (4) is the marginal change rate in land price with respect to the amount of open 
space, and which can be regarded as the standardized marginal benefit per unit land of 
open space preservation.  Let g(a) = P’(a + a
0)/P(a + a
0), which describes how local 
residents’ standardized willingness to pay (WTP) changes with preserved open space.  




















=       (5) 
Because P’(a + a
0) > 0 and P”(a + a
0) < 0, g’(a) < 0, which means residents’ standardized 
WTP is decreasing with preserved open space.    10
The right hand side of equation (4) is the standardized marginal cost per unit 
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standardized marginal cost per unit remaining land would change with preserved open 
space.  Take the first derivative of f(a) with respect to a 
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How f(a) changes with respect to a depends on the sign of the nominator of f’(a).  Some 
algebraic manipulations can show that  
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These mathematical properties show that the standardized marginal cost per unit 
remaining land, f(a), may decrease for up to a fixed amount of open space, increases 
when a is large enough, and eventually goes to infinity as a is approaching the total 
amount of the remaining land L – a
0.   
Equation (4) requires at the optimal level a
* of increment of open space, the 
standardized marginal benefit equals the standardized marginal cost per unit remaining 
land, which means the curve of residents’ standardized WTP g(a) crosses the curve of the 
standardized marginal cost per unit remaining land f(a) at a = a
* (See figure 1).  Since 
resident’s standardized WTP g(a) monotonically decreases with open space, and the   11
standardized marginal cost per unit remaining land eventually increases to infinity with 
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Therefore, if residents’ standardized WTP at the time of the land manager’s preservation 
decision is sufficiently large so as to go beyond 2/(L – a
0), preserving more open space 
would improve the welfare of land owners by raising the total value of community land.   
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>  indicates preserving open space is more likely to 
be welfare-improving for a community with a large amount of land L that preserved a 
small amount a
0 of open space.  This is because on one hand, the standardized marginal 
cost per unit remaining land 2/(L – a
0) is very low, on the other hand, local residents 
would pay more money to preserve open space, as revealed by P’(a
0)/P(a
0).   
We derive the following proposition. 
Proposition 1  If local residents prefer preserving open space, and if the utility 
function of local residents is concave in preserved open space, there is an optimal (or 
incremental) amount of open space that is socially efficient if local residents’ 
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III.  Tax Increment Financing for Optimal Open Space Preservation 
The second question confronting the land manager is the possibility of using property tax 
increment to finance the socially efficient incremental amount of open space. 
Economically, we are interested in the interaction between economic conditions of social 
efficiency and tax increment financing.           12
We extend the previous land manager’s model by incorporating a budget 
constraint that the investment cost of open space is not greater than the collectable 
portion of the increased tax revenue due to appreciated land value within a planned 
financing period.  Denote the property tax rate by τ.  The tax revenue before preservation 
is the total current property value multiplied by property tax rate, τP(a
0)(L-a
0); the tax 
revenue after preservation is the total post-preservation property value multiplied by 
property tax rate, τP(a + a
0)(L – a
0  – a).  Within a finance period T, the present value of 
aggregate increased tax revenue with the discount rate δ is  
∫
− − − − − +
T t a dt e a L a P a a L a a P
0
0 0 0 )] )( ( ) )( ( [
δ τ τ       (8) 
Suppose the property tax represents the total of property value-based tax revenues that 
are collected by overlapping local jurisdictions such as the school district.  Practically, 
this total increased tax revenue may not be available for preserving open space.  
Depending on the specification of the zone for tax increment financing (TIF), only a 
portion of the aggregate increased tax revenue may be used for preserving open space.  
Therefore, we introduce a factor w to capture the actual amount of tax increment that can 
be used to finance preserving open space: 
∫
− − − − − +
T tdt we a L a P a a L a a P
0
0 0 0 0 )] )( ( ) )( ( [
δ τ τ     (9)    
Integrate (9)   
)] )( ( ) )( ( [ ) 1 (
1 0 0 0 0 a L a P a a L a a P w e
T − − − − + −
− τ
δ
δ             (10) 
which represents the total budget for preserving an incremental amount a of open space  
a a P a L a P a a L a a P w e
T ) ( )] )( ( ) )( ( [ ) 1 (
1 0 0 0 0 0 ≥ − − − − + −
− τ
δ
δ   (11)   13
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Inequality (12) identifies the relationship among policy parameters, such as the financing 
period T and property tax rate τ, residents’ bid price for land, and the incremental amount 
a of open space, if preserving open space a is to be financed by property tax increment.  
Note that this inequality is derived based on a balanced budget for an arbitrary amount of 
open space a between 0 and L – a
0, the total available land.  For alternative settings of 
policy context, (12) can be relied on to examine policy variables of interest.  For 
example, if local land managers know how land rent changes with preserved open space, 
inequality (12) can be used to determine the amount of open space that can be financed 
by property tax increment for given policy parameters.  On the other hand, (12) can also 
be used to identify the restriction on households’ bid price for land and other policy 
variables if land managers intend to use tax increment to finance open space preservation.     
  To identify a weaker condition for using property tax increment to finance open 


















    (13) 
As before, we examine the property of the self-financed amount of open space by 
comparing the locus of two independent functions of preserved open space involved in 
inequality (13).  Let Ψ(a) = P(a + a
0)/P(a
0), which represents the ratio of bid price per unit 














, which represents the critical value of the bid price   14
ratio under the constraint of tax increment financing, given policy parameters and the 
amount of open space to be preserved.  We can derive the following properties for these 
two functions: 
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The above properties suggest that both curves Ψ(a) and Φ(a) start from the same point (0, 
1), and increase with the amount of preserved open space a (see figure 2).  However, the 
bid ratio Ψ(a) increases with the amount of preserved open space at a decreasing rate, 
while the critical value Φ(a) increases at an increasing rate which goes to infinity when a 
is approaching the total available land L – a
0.  Therefore, if the marginal bid ratio Ψ’(a) is 
larger than the marginal critical value Φ’(a) at a = 0, their loci will cross each other for 
some amount a
t of open space, where Φ(a
t) = Ψ(a
t), because the marginal critical value 
Φ’(a) goes to infinity when a is getting close to L – a
0.  Before a is reaching a
t, 0 < a < a
t, 
the bid ratio Ψ(a) is greater than the critical value Φ(a), which implies property tax 
increment is sufficient to cover the expenditure in open space, and vice versa.  In this 
case, a
t represents the maximum amount of open space that can be self-financed without 
imposing a new tax or increasing the current property tax rate.     15
  The above mathematical exposure on the self-financed amount of open space 
reveals an important condition for tax increment financing.  That is, the marginal bid 
price ratio at the starting point Ψ’(0) = P’(a
0)/P(a
0) must be greater than the marginal 
critical value at the starting point Φ’(0) =  ) 1 (
1




, otherwise the maximum 
amount a
t of open space that can be financed by tax increment would be zero.   
So far, we have identified two amounts of open space and two types of conditions:  
•  the socially efficient amount of open space a*, under the condition for the 
marginal change rate of households’ bid price with respect to open space at the 








•  the maximum self-financed amount of open space at, under the condition for the 
marginal change rate of the bid price ratio with respect to open space at the 













The central question is under what conditions the socially efficient amount of open space 
can be fully financed by property tax increment. 
  Answering the above question reduces to comparing those two amounts of open 
space and their corresponding conditions.  The sufficient condition for a non-zero a
t that 












> , constitutes another 
necessary condition for the socially efficient amount a* of open space to be self-financed.  
If the ratio δ/(τw) is less than 1, those two necessary conditions for the socially efficient 




a L a P
a P
−
> .  Similarly, if the   16
ratio δ/(τw) is greater than 1, the necessary condition for the socially efficient amount of 












> .   Note that 
these two conditions only guarantee the existence of the socially efficient amount a
* and 
the self-financed amount a
t, but remain neutral on the relative magnitudes of a
* and a
t.  
Therefore, as long as the standardized residents’ current WTP for open space, or the 
marginal change rate of the equilibrium land price with respect to preserved open space, 
is great than the larger of  ) 1 (
1




 and  0
2
a L −
, there exists at least a self-financed 
amount a
t of open space, and may exist a socially efficient amount a
* that can also be 
covered by increased tax revenue, depending on the relative magnitudes of a
t and a
*.  
  Unfortunately, the relative magnitude of a
t and a
* is not explicit.  We proceed by 
examining the condition required of residents’ WTP under which the socially efficient 
amount a
* of open space can be fully covered by property tax increment, i.e., a
* < a
t.  We 
define the following system for the set Γ such that ∀a
*∈Γ is socially efficient and can 
also be fully financed by property tax increment: 1) the socially efficient amount a
* of 
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Substitute (14) into condition 1), 
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which is a second necessary condition for the socially efficient amount of open space to 
be self-financed.  Recall that the condition for the existence of a non-zero socially 
efficient amount of open space is in favor of a large marginal change rate of equilibrium 
land price at the starting level of preserved open space, because a large marginal change 
rate of equilibrium land price means residents are willing to pay a large amount of money 
for preserving an extra unit amount of open space in the community, relative to the 
marginal cost associated with this preservation.  The condition (15), however, imposes an 
upper bound on the marginal change rate of equilibrium land price if the increased tax 
revenue is the only source of fund for open space preservation.  In condition (15), the 
right hand side can still be thought of as the marginal cost of preservation, but this 
marginal cost is the maximum defined by tax increment financing.  If the post-
preservation marginal benefit, as represented by the left hand side, is greater than the 
financially defined marginal cost, it would be socially efficient to preserve more open 
space which, however, is beyond the capacity of tax increment financing.  As a result, the 
post-preservation marginal benefit less than the financially defined marginal cost is a 
necessary condition for the socially efficient amount of open space to be fully self-
financed.     
We summarize as follows the condition for the existence of a non-zero amount of 
open space that is socially efficient and that can also be fully covered by property tax 
increment:    18
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We derive the following proposition.  
Proposition 2  If local residents prefer preserving open space, and if the utility 
function of local residents is concave in preserved open space, there is an optimal (or 
incremental) amount of open space that is socially efficient and can be fully financed by 
property tax increment due to the capitalization of open space amenity, if the pre-
preservation marginal change rate of equilibrium land price with respect to open space, 
or  local residents’ standardized pre-preservation willingness to pay for open space, is 
greater than the larger of  0
2
a L −
 and  ) 1 (
1
0 +
− w a L τ
δ
 , and if the post-preservation 
marginal change rate of equilibrium land price with respect to open space, or local 
residents’ standardized post-preservation willingness to pay for open space is less than 
or equal to 
δ τ
τ
* 0 * 0 ) (
1
a w a L
w
a a L + −
+
− −
.         
 
IV.  Effect of Spatially Heterogeneity in Open Space Amenity  
The theoretical model constructed in section 2 implicitly assumes a spatially 
homogeneous open space amenity as if local residents equally receive the same open 
space amenity, as represented by the amount of preserved open space.  Consequently, the 
preserved open space equally raises the equilibrium land price of the remaining land.  In 
some instances such as the considered community is of small spatial scales, or the 
existence value of open space is prominent to local residents, this assumption may be   19
reasonable.  Hedonic valuation studies, however, also found in many cases people value 
their access to preserved open space in addition to the open space amount, which leads to 
spatially varying land value at market equilibrium in response to the amenities that local 
residents perceive they actually receive from preserved open space at their residence 
locations (see Do and Grudnitski 1995, Geoghegan et al. 1997, Lutzenhiser and Netusil 
2001, Mahan et al. 2000, Tyravinen and Miettinen 2000, for example).  When the 
capitalization of open space amenity differs spatially, the previous economic condition 
for self-financed, socially efficient open space preservation may be biased toward the 
optimistic direction in the sense that property value may be overestimated.  In this 
section, we introduce a distance variable in addition to open space area into the open 
space amenity measure, and examine how this spatial heterogeneity in open space 
amenities as perceived by local residents affects the economic condition of tax increment 
financed, socially efficient open space preservation. 
  As before, the residential community in a metropolitan area is represented by their 
location x and preserved open space a.  Each household derives utility U = U(z, q, A(a, 
r)) from their consumption of a numeraire good z, housing q in the units of land area, and 
open space amenity A, while subject to the budget constraint z + Rq + tx = Y.  Note that 
the open space amenity A is a function of the amount of preserved open space a and 
household specific location r relative to the open space in the community, and therefore, 
each household can affect the amenity level of open space at their residence location by 
their choice of residential community (x, a) and specific location r in the selected 
community.  The non-spatial model in section 2, which only considered the amount of   20
preserved open space without referring the relative location r, can be regarded as a 
special case of the spatial model where A = A(a) = a.  
  Consider a circular residential community with a radius r0, which, as will be seen, 
is not essential to the model. Assume the community has already preserved some land of 
a
0 units at the community center as a circular central community park, and is considering 
to expand the range of the park outward further, with its radius changing from ra0 to ra1.  
If the area of the planned open space increment is a, the total value of the remaining land 
after preservation is∫ +
0
1
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r rdr r a A P π , which is approximately 
equal to P(A(a
0, ra0))a when the involved variation in the radius of preserved open space 
is limited.  Consequently, the land manager’s model of using property tax increment to 
finance socially efficient open space preservation becomes 
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Compared to the non-spatial model, the model accounting for the spatial pattern of 
equilibrium land price is complicated by the integral of land value over the remaining 
land.  This complicating, however, can be simplified using the average value theorem.  
Specifically, the total value of the remaining land after preservation  
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where  ) (
~ 0 a a P +  is the post-preservation equilibrium land price independent of spatial 
location such that 
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where  ) (
~ 0 a P  is the pre-preservation average equilibrium land price independent of 
spatial location.  If we still assume the total area of community land is L, the total value 
of the remaining land after preservation becomes  ) )( (
~ 0 0 a a L a a P − − + , and the total 
value of the land before preservation is  ) )( (
~ 0 0 a L a P − .  Therefore, the spatial model of 
tax increment financing of socially efficient open space transforms into 
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which is exactly the same as the non-spatial model except that the equilibrium land price 
is replaced by some spatial average value.  Therefore, the basic conclusion based on the 
non-spatial model would not change except the non-spatial equilibrium land price 
replaced by the spatial average land price.   
Practically, to evaluate the condition for the self-financed, socially efficient 
amount of open space for communities with given parameters requires estimation of the 
marginal change rate of equilibrium land price, or residents’ WTP, at both pre- and post-
preservation levels of preserved open space.  The equilibrium land price may exhibit a 
spatial pattern rather than a spatially homogenous rate of capitalization when 
communities or cities are sufficiently large, but often when tax increment financing is   22
invoked for constructing local infrastructure, the involved area is commonly restricted to 
a smaller in situ area or block, i.e., the financing district, rather than the whole city.  In 
this area, equilibrium land rent can be considered spatially homogeneous.  Specifically, 
estimating the marginal change rate of equilibrium land rent requires defining and 
compiling a data set of land price for districts or small communities across the 
metropolitan area that contain varying amount of preserved open space, such that 
equilibrium land price is homogeneous with respect to open space within the district and 
heterogeneous with respect to open space among districts.  Consequently, a hedonic land 
price function, lnP(a) = f(x1, x2, …, a, a
2, a
3, …) can be estimated, where xi represents 















where βi is the estimated coefficient parameter, the marginal change rate of equilibrium 
land price can be estimated for different amounts of open space.  Even if the involved 
area for tax increment financing is large enough to support spatially varying equilibrium 
land price, the spatial average equilibrium land price can be estimated more easily by the 
normal procedure of hedonic method without dividing the city into small homogeneous 
tracts.  In addition, a contingent survey can also be used to directly solicit local residents’ 
WTP for open space.  Benefit transfer presents another option to derive the information 
that is needed for evaluating the decision of open space preservation.    
In the investigation of the economic condition for a self-financed, socially 
efficient system of open space preservation, we didn’t impose strong restrictions on the 
common utility function such as specifying a specific function form except only requiring 
concavity.  Consequently, the economic condition is derived as general as possible.  For 
example, the marginal change rate of equilibrium land price is a non-linear rather than   23
linear function of preserved open space.  In many empirical studies, the equilibrium land 
price is estimated as a linear function of preserved open space.  In such a context, even 
more simple conditions can be identified.  For example, in the linear case, the economic 
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community or tax increment financing zone.  For a large community where it is 
reasonable to assume a spatially heterogeneous equilibrium land price, the condition is 
modified by replacing the marginal change rate of equilibrium land price with its spatial 
average.  
 
V.  Spatial Configuration of Open Space 
To local land managers, the preservation of open space practically is a matter of how to 
construct such open space to maximize its net social value.  Is one large tract of open 
space better than several small spatially separated ones? Where should the optimal open 
space be located to maximize its amenity effect on local residents? How does the shape 
of open space affect its amenity to local residents through the interaction of area and 
access?  Perhaps, local land managers are also interested in what is the possible spatial 
configuration for the socially efficient, self-financed open space that is socially optimal.  
In this section, we explore the effect of spatial configuration of preserved open 
space on the value of community developable land and the financing capacity of property 
tax increment.  We relate the spatial structure of open space to be considered to the 
practical question of how large, how many, what shape, and where to locate which local 
land managers are most concerned with for preserving open space.  We extend our   24
theoretical model to incorporate these policy-related spatial considerations in a two-
dimensional coordinate system and assume the community has no preserved open space.   
As will be shown below, incorporating the spatial aspects of open space dramatically 
complicates the model such that a closed-form, tractable analytical solution is impossible 
without further assumption.  Consequently, we use a simulation approach to explore these 
spatial effects, and expect the simulation results would reveal implications for the optimal 
structure of open space in the context of tax increment financing.  
Similar to the non-spatial model, the spatially explicit model maximizes the net 
value of community land by investing in open space subject to the capacity of tax 
increment financing.  
s y x aMax
), , ( 0 0
   ) ), , ( ( 0 0 s y x a π = )] , ( ) 0 ( ) ), , ( ), , (( [ 0 0 0 0 y x a P dxdy s y x a y x P − ∫∫
Ω
      (22) 





δ τ τ    (23) 
where P((x,y), a(x0,y0), s) is location-specific equilibrium land price, depending on its 
location (x,y) relative to the location (x0,y0) of the preserved open space with an area a(x0, 
y0) and shape s, and Ω is the set of (x, y) within the community but not belonging to the 
preserved open space a(x0, y0).   
Assume the utility function of local residents is in the form of a Cobb-Douglas 
function, U(z, q, A(x,y)) = z
αq
1-αA(x,y)
β, where A(x,y) is location-specific open space 
amenity at (x,y) determined by the distance to the location (x0,y0) and the configuration of 
open space a(x0,y0), and α and β are preference parameters with 0 < α <1 and β > 0.  
Following the same steps as with the non-spatial model, we can derive the utility-  25
maximizing choice of numeraire good z and house size q at each location (x,y) for given 
land rent R and travel cost t,  
    z = α(m – tD(x,y))                                                                           (24) 
    q = (1- α)(m – tD(x,y))/R                                                     (25) 
Similarly, we can solve for the land rent function,  
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Therefore, the equilibrium land price   
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which describes how equilibrium land price varies spatially with respect to open space 
amenity A(x, y), income m, distance to the CBD D(x, y), the exogenous level of utility V, 
and preference parameters, α and β.   
To examine the effect of the size, shape, and location of preserved open space, we 
need to further specify the location-specific open space amenity in relation to the spatial 
structure of open space.  Unfortunately, precisely describing open space amenity is an 
empirical question, and there is no theoretical a priori on their quantitative representation 
except some empirical findings regarding the spatial pattern of land value.   Generally, 
empirical studies have agreed on that 1) the further from preserved open space, the lower 
property or land value; and 2) the larger preserved open space, the higher property or land 
value.  Since land rent (or price) is a monotonic function of open space amenity on that 
land, these empirical findings may help discover an empirically effective measure of 
open space amenities that is consistent with people’s perception.  We adopted with some 
modification a function used by Wu and Plantinga (2003) to describe open space amenity 
that is consistent with those empirical restrictions     26
A(x,y) = 1 + e
-γd(x,y|x0,y0,s)a(x0,y0)      (28)   
where d(x,y|x0, y0, s) denotes the distance from any location (x,y) to the open space at 
(x0,y0) with shape s, and γ is the dissipating parameter of open space amenity.   
By this specification, open space amenity decreases with the distance from and 
increases with the size of preserved open space.  The shape s affects amenity level 
through its effect on local accessibility of open space measured by the distance from each 
land parcel to the edge of preserved open space.  Substituting the amenity function into 







Without loss of generality, we suppress the difference in the distance of each land parcel 
within a community to the CBD, and use P(0) to represent equilibrium land price without 
preserved open space.  As a result, the equilibrium land price function can be expressed 
as product of land price without open space P(0) and open space amenity A(x,y),  
          P((x,y), a(x0,y0), s, P(0)) = P(0)(1 + e
-γd(x,y|x0,y0,s)a(x0,y0)) 
β/(1-α)                          (29) 
We use this land price function to simulate the effect of some common spatial 
configurations of open space on the net value of community land and the capacity of tax 
increment financing for a rectangle-shaped (4000m×8000m) community, centered at 
coordinate origin, with x ranging from –2000m to 2000m, and y ranging from –4000m to 
4000m.  This community can also be considered as a district in a city that uses property 
tax increment to finance preserving open space.  Table 1 presents the value of parameters 
we used for simulation.     27
Effect of the Location of Open Space  
  We first focus on one of the most common forms of open space, circular open 
space such as a community park.  The context is set up by two practical questions 
frequently raised: 1) What is the optimal size of community park? and 2) Where should 
the community park be located to have maximal social value?  These two questions, 
although raised separately, are related to each other.  We will simulate 1) how the net 
value of community land varies with the size of open space, 2) how the size of open 
space affects the capacity of property tax increment to finance public investment in this 
open space, and 3) how the location of open space affects the above relationships. 
Figure 3 presents three scenarios with differently located community park for 
simulation.  Panel A describes the idea of providing a central park in the community with 
coordinate origin (0,0) at the park center.  Panel B and C change the location of the 
community park to the right with park center at (1000,0) and to the upper community 
with park center at (0,2000) relative to community center, respectively.  Figure 4 
summarizes how the net value of community land and property tax increment vary with 
respect to the size of open space for different spatial location.  As we can see, in all 
spatial locations, there exists a globally optimal amount of open space that can be 
financed by tax increment within a 5-year period.  Specifically, panel A shows the net 
social value of a center-located circular open space increases until the size of open space 
reaches 500 acres, and decreases when the area of open space is beyond 500 acres.  
Property tax increment also illustrates the same tendency.  Interestingly, the peak-value 
size of open space is not the maximum amount that can be financed solely by increased 
tax revenue, which is around 1250 acres when the increased tax revenue drops to zero   28
within a 5- year horizon of financing.  This means, although the property tax increment 
can finance more investment than desired in open space, that public investment may not 
be socially optimal.   
Panel B and C illustrates the location effect.  Although both the net social value of 
open space and property tax increment demonstrate similar trends with respect to the area 
of open space, the peak-value size of open space is different in three spatial locations.  As 
we can see, the peak-value size is 400 acres for the open space located to the right and 
300 acres for located in the upper community relative to community center, which 
implies the maximum net social value of open space could be different for different 
locations.  In our simulation, the maximum net social value of open space that can be 
reached is the highest with the central location.  Also, tax increment curve is different in 
three locations.  When the community park is located to the right of community center, 
the maximum capacity of tax increment financing is around 1130 acres, while it drops to 
1010 acres when open space is located in the upper community.   
These changes in both the financing capacity of property tax increment and the 
net social value caused by varying locations can be attributed to the effect of community 
shape on the externality of open space.  Preserving open space in a community can be 
considered as producing an amenity field, analog to the physical gravity or magnetic 
field, in which each location is associated with an amenity generated by that open space.  
When open space is located in community center, most, if not all, of its positive 
externality is captured in the value of the land within community boundaries (or more 
community land are covered by open space amenity).  But when open space is not 
centrally located, it is very likely that relatively less positive externality is captured into   29
land value, and more open space amenity would spill over community boundaries.  
Moreover, we can predict that the net social value of open space and the capacity of the 
property tax increment could be even lower when open space is located near to the 
boundary of a local jurisdiction because more of the positive externality would arise 
outside the community’s territory.   
Based on the simulation, we can derive two general results.  If local residents 
desire the public open space like a community park, and do care about the size and 
accessibility of such open space, central location is more likely to generate higher social 
value and improve the capacity of tax increment financing for public investment in open 
space.  Second, exhausting the capacity of tax increment financing to provide the 
maximum possible amount of open space may not be socially desirable and may even 
decrease the net social value of open space although such investment may not impose 
extra fiscal burden on local town government.                  
Effect of the Distribution of Open Space  
  Very often local policy-makers must decide between providing one large tract 
versus several small pieces of open space.  We simulate this distribution effect in this 
subsection.  Theoretically, the spatial distribution of open space can be a continuous 
function of spatial location, but in real world it is more likely to be discrete.  Here we 
only consider several typical discrete cases with circular open space that are of policy 
concern.  We first focus on two circular open space with equal areas and simulate the 
effect of location and the distance between them.  More specifically, we examine how the 
net value of community land and property tax increment change with the interdistance 
between open space for three different locations: diagonal, x axis, and y axis.  To   30
compare with a single large circular open space, we equalize the total area of two circular 
open space to the optimal amount of one circular open space as identified previously.  
Subsequently, we examine four circular open space and alternate the total area.    
  Figure 5 shows distribution of two circular parks of open space in different 
directions.  As demonstrated by figure 6, in all three directions, the net social value of 
open space and property tax increment increase first and then decrease with the distance 
between open space.  However, the turning points at which both net social value and tax 
increment change from increasing to decreasing are different.  When located along the 
community diagonal, both net social value and tax increment reach their peaks when the 
interdistance between open space is 2100m, while the peak-value interdistances are 600m 
and 3000m respectively when located along x axis and y axis from community center.  If 
we compare these peak-value interdistances with the interdistance resulting from 
geometrically even division, we will find the former is no less than the latter.  As shown 
by figure 6, after adjusting for the size of open space, the peak-value distance is 3628m 
for diagonal, 1728m for x direction, and 4128m for y direction, while the interdistance 
based on geometrically even division is 2981m for diagonal, 1333m for x direction, and 
2666m for y direction, shorter than those peak-value interdistances.  A possible 
explanation is, the overlap of amenity on land located between open space tends to 
increase the interdistance of open space to balance with land located outside of the 
overlap of amenity.  As a result, the comparison suggests that optimal location tends to 
evenly distribute open space at least physically.  This property is implicitly consistent 
with the finding in the previous section, that is, a single open space should be located in 
the center of a community, and two open space should be evenly distributed in the chosen   31
direction.  Furthermore, the interdistance between open space should be greater than the 
average distance in the chosen direction as long as the amenity effect of open space can 
reach half of the average distance.  
The comparison of the net social value of open space among these three types of 
locations further confirms the optimal rule of evenly distributing open space amenity.  
With this rule of even distribution, the optimal location of two areas of open space should 
be in favor of locations in the y direction relative to the x direction because the 
community is rectangle-shaped with the y dimension being longer than the x dimension, 
and locating along the long dimension could more evenly distribute open space amenity 
without more amenity falling outside the community.  The comparison of the distribution 
effect is not explicit between the y or x direction and the diagonal direction.  Although the 
diagonal is longer than the length of community, panel A shows the distribution of open 
space amenity is not even, with the land at the end of the diagonal getting more amenity 
than the land at the end of the other diagonal.  Therefore, the comparison between y or x 
direction and diagonal is ambiguous depending on how the amenity effect of open space 
distributes as perceived by local residents.            
  Next, we simulate the size effect for four evenly distributed circular open space 
(see figure 7 panel A).  The open space are spatially located such that the interdistance 
between open space in x and y directions are consistent with the peak-value distance 
identified for two circular open space.   
Panel B summarizes the area effect of the open space on the net value of 
community land and property tax increment.  Note the area of open space on x axis 
indicates the total area of four circular areas of open space.  Interestingly, the peak-value   32
size of open space for net social value is 450 acres, smaller than its counterpart for a 
single open space, while the capacity of tax increment financing is 1270 acres, larger than 
that for one single large open space.  We compare the maximum net social values of four 
evenly distributed areas of open space and one central park, and find the four areas with a 
value of $7.6634×10
7 is larger than the single park with a value of $7.4724×10
7.  This 
result seems to suggest that splitting one large open space into several small pieces and 
evenly distributing these pieces may improve the net social value of open space and 
create more tax increment and thus financing capacity.  The comparison between two 
areas of open space and one large tract of open space also supports this result.  In other 
words, changing the distribution of open space can be a useful tool for policy-makers 
especially in situations such as insufficient tax increment to finance preserving open 
space.  
Effect of the Shape of Open Space 
  In this subsection, we examine the effect of the shape of open space on the net 
value of community land and property tax increment.  We consider two typical shapes of 
open space: ring (a circular belt), and cross (see figure 8).  For the shape of a cross, we 
focus on the area effect when open space is located across a community center, while for 
a ring-shaped green belt, we not only examine the area effect but also simulate the effect 
of spatial locations.  
  Figure 9 illustrates the shape effect of open space.  Panel A and B compare 
different locations of an open space ring.  Specifically, when open space is located at 
300m from the center of community, the net social value reaches its maximum of 
$7.5407×10
7 at 432 acres; while when open space is located at 900m from the center of   33
community, the net social value reaches its maximum of $7.8889×10
7 at 402 acres.  This 
comparison demonstrates the interaction between area and location, and implies that the 
ring-shaped open space could be more efficient in terms of higher net social value and 
lower size of open space when located farther or the radius of the ring is larger within 
certain distance.  This result is consistent with intuition since the larger the radius of ring, 
the larger the perimeter and thus more developable land exposed to open space amenity 
for a given amount of open space.  Because of this value effect, the capacity of tax 
increment financing is larger when the radius is 900m with the size of around 1440 acres 
than when the radius is 300m with the size of around 1275 acres.  Panel C reveals a very 
different peak-value size for the cross-shaped open space, where the peak-value area is 
around 300 acres with a maximum net social value of $7.8435×10
7.   
Combining these results with the case of circular open space, we do find the shape 
of open space could affect the net social value of open space as well as the capacity of tax 
increment financing.  Which shape of open space is preferred depends on the policy 
objective of local jurisdiction and other constraints.  In our simulation example, the ring 
shape, among other shapes, maximizes, at least for the given preference, the net social 
value of open space without incurring extra cost for financing these investments.  
However, the ring-shaped open space may not be most efficient in terms of the net social 
value per unit investment because the cross-shape can reach a similar net social value 
with a smaller amount of open space preserved.   
Nonetheless, a central large open space like a community park may be relatively 
easy to set aside and socially desirable with less administration and/or transaction cost 
and other political, legal, and fiscal constraints.  For example, although requiring less   34
acquisition of open space land, the cross and the ring shapes may involve a large group of 
private landowners and consequently the administration or transaction costs to acquire 
their land may be prohibitive, while a central park may be administratively more 
desirable involving less private landowners.  However, in case that acquiring open space 
is extremely difficult, the cross-shaped open space might be a most desirable choice for 
local land managers because the cross-shape requires a smaller amount of open space to 
achieve a greater gain in the net social value.   
To summarize, the ring shape with large radius is optimal in terms of the net 
social value achieved but not efficient, while the across shape is most efficient in terms of 
social value achievement for per unit open space preserved but may not be politically 
defendable.  A central circular open space may be a good alternative for both shapes of 
open space by its reasonable efficiency and political desirability.       
 
VI.  Conclusions 
Preserving open space has been an important issue for local governments.  Given the 
strong support of local residents for open space preservation, a practical question left to 
local policy-makers is how they can finance the public investment in open space 
preservation in a politically desirable way.  Do local governments need to impose an 
open space fee or raise the tax rate to finance open space preservation? Our economic 
study shows charging a fee or raising the tax rate may not be necessary.  The reason is 
simple although the underlying mechanism is less explicit.  People value and are willing 
to pay for open space preservation in their neighborhoods.  People pay for open space 
through “vote with your feet” and consequently capitalize their valuation of open space   35
into residence location.  This capitalization raises property value, and further increases 
tax revenue that may be sufficient enough to fully cover the investment in open space.  
Our economic model identified under what condition(s) there exists a non-zero socially 
efficient amount of open space that can be fully financed by property tax increment.  
However, people value open space differently and only pay for the amount of amenity 
they receive at their residence location from preserved open space rather than pay at a 
fixed rate.  Our economic model demonstrates these spatial effects of structured open 
space by simulating different spatial configurations that may be commonly have been 
commonly considered by local land managers in preserving open space.       
Our economic model shows that there exists an optimal amount of open space that 
can maximize the net value of community land, as long as local residents’ (standardized) 
current willingness to pay for open space, as revealed by the marginal change rate of 
equilibrium land price with respect to open space, is more than 2 times the inverse of the 
total area of community developable land, a very weak condition given the typical 
magnitude of relevant parameters for a community.  This condition establishes the 
theoretical foundation for local governments to preserve open space but remain neutral on 
how to finance open space preservation.  If local governments intend to use the property 
tax increment to finance acquiring open space land, there exists at least a second best 
level of open space that can be fully financed by increased tax revenue and that may be 
socially efficient, as long as the maximum possible marginal change rate of the 
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.  Surprisingly, a strong capitalization of open space amenity into land   36
value may not guarantee the socially efficient level of open space to be self-financed.  For 
the socially efficient level of open space to be self-financed, the marginal change rate of 
post-preservation equilibrium land price with respect to preserved open space must be 
less than or equal to 
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, the financially defined marginal 
cost.  Although derived based on spatially homogeneous open space amenity, these 
conditions can be extended to spatially distributed open space amenity if people’s bid 
price is taken as a spatial average.  
  Our simulation results for the spatially explicit open space model not only show 
the existence of an optimal amount of open space that can be financed by property tax 
increment even for a weak preference for open space preservation (with a utility elasticity 
of 0.04 with respect to open space), but also illustrate the spatial configuration of open 
space does matter in terms of the net value of community developable land and the 
capacity of tax increment financing.  Generally speaking, an evenly distributed, centrally 
located open space can achieve greater net social value and stronger capacity of tax 
increment financing than other spatial configurations of open space.  That is, a central 
location is better than non-central location, several small pieces is better than one large 
piece, a ring shape is better than a circle, and a cross shape may or may not be more 
efficient than a ring shape.  However, a central community park may be politically 
desirable by less administration or transaction cost involved in the acquisition of involved 
open space land if private ownerships of the land involved are relatively concentrated.  
These optimal spatial configurations, we suspect, are very likely to be robust, since they 
tend to maximize the coverage of the positive externality of open space.  Moreover, the 
people’s preference and the description of open space amenity used in our simulation are   37
representative, at least to the extent that they capture the basic characteristics of how 
people value open space as found in many empirical studies.  Another important finding 
we believe valuable to local policy-makers is exhausting the capacity of tax increment 
financing to acquire open space land may not be socially desirable if local governments 
decide to do so.      38
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Table 1.  The Value of Parameters Used in Simulation 





The proportion of disposable income adjusted by travel cost spent 
on housing 
β  0.04  The relative elasticity of utility with respect to open space 
amenity 
γ  0.002  Dissipating parameter of open space amenity 
δ  0.05  Discount rate 
τ  0.15  Property tax rate 
T  5 years  Financing period 
R(0)  $400  Land rent without open space amenity 
    42
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Figure 1.  Demonstration of the Existence of the Optimal Amount of Open Space   43
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Figure 2.  Demonstration of Tax Increment Constraint 
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Figure 4.  Value Effect of Spatial Configuration of Circular Open Space   45
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Figure 6.  Distributional Effect of Circular Open Space   46
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Figure 9.  Shape Effect of Open Space 
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